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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We
consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping and
regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction and credit spread
changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are
more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for regulatory purposes, but do not seem
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william.goetzmann@yale.eduCredit Rating Agencies (CRAs) report information about the credit risk of xed income securities.
The various ways the information is used by nancial, legal and regulatory entities may potentially
inuence the nature of the information production process. Bond ratings are not only used to assess
risk, they are also used for regulatory certication, e.g. to classify securities into investment grade (IG)
and high yield (HY, or junk) status. These classications in turn inuence institutional demand and
serve as bright-line triggers in corporate credit arrangements and regulatory oversight. Regulations may
mandate insurance companies and banks to keep much higher reserve capital for high yield issues than
for investment grade corporate bonds. Other institutions like pension funds and mutual funds are often
restricted by their charters in the amount of HY debt they can hold. Taken together, more than half of
all corporate bonds are held by institutions that are subject to rating-based restrictions on their holdings
of risky credit assets (Campbell and Taksler (2003)). Lower demand for high yield bond can signicantly
increase the cost of borrowing for those issuers and is related to capital structure decisions (see Ellul,
Jotikasthira and Lundblad (2009), Kisgen and Strahan (2009), Kisgen (2006, 2009)). The institutional
and regulatory importance of credit ratings to issuers and investors has raised questions about whether
the current system provides the proper incentives for issuers to fully disclose value-relevant information,
and for investors to invest in research about credit risk.
Using a sample from 2000 - 2008, we document that almost all large, liquid US corporate bond
issues are rated by both S&P and Moody's. Fitch typically plays the role of a "third opinion" for large
bond issues1. During the time period the most prevalent institutional rule used for classifying rated
bonds was that, if an issue has two ratings, only the lower rating could be used to classify the issue (e.g.
into investment-grade or non-investment grade). However, for issues with three ratings, the middle
rating should be used (see, for example, the NAIC guidelines or the Basel II accord).2 Therefore, if
S&P and Moody's ratings are on opposite sides of the investment grade boundary, the Fitch rating
(assuming it is the marginal, third rating) is the 'tie-breaker' and will decide into which class the issue
falls. Moreover, this rule directly implies that adding a third rating cannot worsen the regulatory rating
classication, but could potentially lead to a higher one. Consistent with this option, we nd that in
about 25% of Fitch rating additions, the addition leads to a regulatory rating improvement, i.e., the
resulting middle rating is higher than the lowest rating before the Fitch rating addition. Ex ante,
such an improvement would be particularly important when S&P and Moody's ratings are on opposite
sides of the investment grade boundary. Absent the improving third rating, the split between S&P
and Moody's would result in a classication of high yield. Thus, the value of the Fitch rating is that
1it can only push the issue up into the investment grade category, not pull it down into the high yield
category.3
In this paper, we explore the nature of this tie-breaking role in the context of the broader question
of why corporate bonds generally have multiple credit ratings. We consider three hypotheses that could
lead to demand for multiple credit ratings, an 'information production' hypothesis, a 'rating shopping'
hypothesis and a 'regulatory certication' hypothesis. These are not mutually exclusive but they have
some dierent empirical implications that we exploit to shed light on their relative importance.
Under the information hypothesis, investors are averse to uncertainty, which is reduced by adding
extra ratings (see e.g. G untay and Hackbarth (2010)). Under the rating shopping hypothesis, issuers
'shop' for an additional rating in the hope of improving their rating (see e.g. Poon and Firth (2005),
Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009)). Under the regulatory certication
hypothesis (see e.g. Brister, Kennedy and Liu (1994)), market and regulatory forces can naturally
arise from a need for credibly separating bond issues into two types: informationally sensitive and
non-informationally sensitive (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993)). These
correspond to non-investment grade (also called high yield) and investment grade ratings, respectively.
If the regulatory certication role of CRA dominates, only the weaker issuers may need a third rating.
This leads us to investigate whether the option of a third rating leads to adverse selection eects. As
mentioned before, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. For example, rating shopping could be
more important and thus more prevalent around the HY-IG boundary.
We nd the strongest evidence in favor of the regulatory certication hypothesis. First, we consider
what happens if a Fitch rating is added for bond issues at the IG/HY boundary, when Fitch could be
the tie-breaker and potentially move the bond issue into the IG class. The yield improves if Fitch rates
the issue IG, but there is no change following a HY rating, with a 40 basis point dierence between an
IG and HY classication. This economically large dierence suggests that the certication eect can
signicantly lower the issuer's cost of capital.
Second, Fitch rating additions or changes for issues that are not close to the HY-IG boundary do
not seem to be related to changes in yields. We nd this not only for Fitch rating additions in a sample
of bond issues already rated by both Moody's and S&P, but also for the full sample of all bonds and
using quarterly panel regressions of credit spread changes on rating updates made by Moody's, S&P
and Fitch. In contrast, credit rating changes (especially downgrades) made by both Moody's and S&P
2are signicantly associated with credit spread changes across the whole rating spectrum.
Third, Cox proportional hazard model regressions indicate that having and getting a Fitch rating
is positively associated with the potential to break the tie between Moody's and S&P ratings, but again
only around the IG-HY boundary. Fourth and nally, comparing default predictions on a one year
horizon across credit rating agencies for corporate bonds rated by all three agencies over 2000 - 2008,
we nd that Moody's ratings perform best, immediately followed by S&P and then by Fitch. Ratings
by Moody's and S&P add signicant forecasting power to those of Fitch, whereas the reverse is not the
case. This is consistent with Fitch providing limited additional valuation information relative to that
contained in Moody's and S&P ratings.
Thus, the credit spread change regressions provide no support for the information production
hypothesis; i.e. that the additional Fitch ratings provide signicant information to investors. However,
further tests provide some suggestive evidence in support of the rating shopping hypothesis around the
HY-IG boundary for possible regulatory arbitrage, but not anywhere else. While the additional Fitch
rating tends to be more optimistic than pre-existing Moody's and S&P ratings, investors do not seem
to incorporate such increased optimism by lowering credit spreads. This would undermine any rationale
to engage in rating shopping. However, we nd that the additional Fitch rating is "extra" optimistic
for issues rated just below IG or for those issues where Fitch is the tie-breaker around the IG-HY
boundary, i.e. more so than elsewhere on the rating spectrum. Those are exactly the issues where we
would expect rating shopping incentives to matter most. Specically, if Moody's and S&P ratings are
on opposite sides of the HY-IG boundary, the additional Fitch rating is more likely than otherwise to
lead to an improvement in the regulatory rating classication, which in this particular case means an
improvement from HY to IG classication (using 'the worst of 2 and median of 3 ratings applies' rule).
This evidence is suggestive of rating shopping around the HY-IG boundary, or that the marginal rating
is used for regulatory arbitrage.4
Endogeneity is a signicant concern in our study, as we rely on controlling for confounding variables
for identication. We seek to mitigate major selection issues by focusing on credit spread changes and
Fitch rating additions. We also directly estimate selection eects using the Cox proportional hazard
model to explain the time to add the third rating.
Taken together, our results suggest that a major function of Fitch ratings could be to avoid adverse
selection for intermediate quality corporate bonds (Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Boot and Thakor
3(1993)). Relatively uninformed investors may be reluctant to trade bond issues where they may be
at a considerable information disadvantage, i.e. HY or junk issues. Investors specialized at producing
information might nd it too costly to do so for medium quality issues, unless they can generate
prot from trading at an informational advantage with uninformed investors, This could lead to a no-
trade region for these intermediate quality bonds. An additional rating that give a clear signal about
whether research will yield relevant information (or whether relatively uninformed investors may be at
a disadvantage) could resolve such a no-trade region. The generally optimistic Fitch ratings may also
be requested as a precautionary measure. For example, issues rated by Fitch ratings are more likely to
have subsequent Moody's and S&P rating transitions, suggesting that these issues have relatively less
stable ratings.
In the long run, a necessary condition for any credit rating agency to have credibility about the IG-
HY classication is that it produces and uses value-relevant information about the rm. A rubber-stamp
rating without research will not serve the certication purpose in the long run. If the regulatory emphasis
on credit ratings is reduced or regulation as to which rating should be used is tightened in the aftermath
of the recent credit crisis, the certication eect documented in this paper may become less pronounced.
In particular, our results suggest that fewer rms may opt for multiple ratings as a result, unless the
marginal CRA can convince the market that its ratings are useful not just for regulatory reasons but
also provide additional information about credit risk (and particularly about separating information-
sensitive from information-insensitive securities). Indeed, less regulatory emphasis on ratings may spur
increased competition among CRAs to improve their information production, especially around the
IG-HY boundary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I contains our motivation for the
empirical tests and the various hypotheses in light of the existing literature. In section II, we discuss
the sample construction and methodology. Section III presents the empirical results on the three
hypotheses. Section IV concludes.
4I Motivation
A Credit Rating Agencies and Regulation
There are currently three major credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the U.S. market: S&P, Moody's
and Fitch. In addition to these big three, there are seven smaller CRAs that issue credit ratings that
qualify for meeting regulatory standards. While the purpose of a credit rating is to reect the credit-
worthiness of an issue or issuer, the rating agencies have some discretion in the philosophy underlying
their rating system and are not required to make their rating methodology public.5
CRAs are licensed as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. This ocial designation has a number of eects. First, CRAs
are exempt from Regulation FD, allowing corporations to share value-relevant information with the
rating agency without disclosing it publicly. Second, the SEC designation allows credit ratings to be
used for meeting regulatory requirements that call for a minimum or an average rating value. For
example, the SEC requires that money market mutual funds hold instruments with a credit rating in
one of the two short-term higher credit rating categories.6 This eectively provides a "safe harbor" for
money market mutual funds with respect to litigation over fund failures. Kisgen (2006) discusses the
strong link between short and long term debt ratings and access to the commercial paper market. He
concludes that in order to have access to the commercial paper market, typically a rating of BBB is
required.
US insurance companies explicitly rely on NRSRO ratings for determining risk-based capital. In
particular, bonds held by insurance companies are assigned capital charges based upon their credit
ratings. For example, a US life insurance company needs to hold over 3 times as much reserve capital
for a BB rated bond compared to a BBB rated bond. At the time of writing, European insurance
companies will soon be subject to comparable regulations with the implementation of 'Solvency II.'
Banking regulations enacted under the so-called 'Basel II accords' impose very similar risk-based capital
requirements.7 Many pension funds and mutual funds are restricted from investing in non-investment
grade corporate bonds by their charter. Although there is much discussion about treating bank and
insurance assets in the context of their total portfolio that would take into account co-variance rather
than security-specic risk, as of mid-2010, a large portion of U.S. institutional portfolios are still subject
to rules and regulation tied to ratings by a relatively small number of NRSROs. The impact of such
5rules and regulations on the functioning of the corporate bond market, in particular in determining
supply and demand, is almost certainly non-trivial since a vast majority of this market is dominated by
institutions that are subject to rating-related restrictions, either through explicit rules and regulations,
or through restrictions stated in their charters.8
In June, 2008, the SEC proposed eliminating language in many regulations pertaining to NRSROs,
and instead to allow an alternative decision-making function, perhaps recognizing that reliance on credit
ratings agencies had the potential to distort the information-gathering and investment decision-making
process. In addition, several other regulations were implemented to try to make rating agencies more
accountable and increase the transparency of the rating process. The motivation for these (proposed)
changes stemmed from the subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007, and from concerns that the
top three CRAs may represent an oligopoly enabled by government regulation. Among other things,
the concern is that this oligopoly might not be the optimal mechanism for revealing information related
to the risk of xed income securities, and instead might be used as an articial safe-harbor to excuse
investment managers from exercising business judgment. As such, it could allow the CRAs to extract
rents from corporations by virtue of serving as "gate-keepers" to the investment-grade (IG) rating,
especially as the CRAs are paid by the corporations whose bonds are rated. Moreover, competition
among CRAs could lead to a so called "race to the bottom", i.e. competition over deteriorating
standards to attract more customers. This is an often heard concern about the structured nance
market in the (subprime) mortgage crisis.
While all of the aforementioned issues are of a regulatory nature, the wider nancial industry has
also grown increasingly dependent on CRAs. Financial institutions center self-regulation around credit
ratings, e.g. mutual funds stating in their charter to only invest in investment-grade (IG) quality xed
income securities. Trading and internal risk management models often take credit ratings either as
primary or as calibration inputs. Many corporate credit arrangements, like collateral requirements and
haircuts are further driven by credit ratings. Moreover, ratings are an important factor in determining
whether a bond qualies for inclusion in prominent corporate bond indices like the Barclays Capital
(formerly Lehman Brothers) US Corporate IG Index.9 Inclusion in such an index may greatly improve
the liquidity of an issue, since for example index tracking institutions will trade more in them. Several
papers show that a higher liquidity leads to lower credit spreads (see for example Chen, Lesmond and
Wei, 2007). Typically, these procedures tend to incorporate all (multiple) rating information available,
extending possible certication eects well beyond those resulting from nancial regulation.
6B Why Multiple Ratings Matter
In this subsection, we consider three dierent mechanisms that could lead rms to solicit and pay
for multiple ratings. We base these hypotheses also on empirical evidence provided by the previous liter-
ature, as summarized in the next subsection. The three hypotheses we consider are (i) the "information
production" hypothesis, (ii) the "rating shopping" hypothesis and (iii) the "regulatory certication"
(or clientele, or regulation) hypothesis. Below, we will give a short description of each and discuss its
testable empirical predictions. As these hypotheses could co-exist and are generally not mutually exclu-
sive, we discuss both how they are related and how we can identify some diering empirical predictions
that allow us to distinguish which hypothesis may dominate empirically. These empirical predictions
are summarized in Table I.
First, the reason to apply for multiple ratings could be the need for increased information produc-
tion. More ratings can reduce uncertainty about the credit quality of the rated bonds. In a setting in
which each CRA relies on dierent kinds of information to rate bonds, multiple perspectives are advan-
tageous and reduce uncertainty about default probability. CRAs may specialize in evaluating particular
drivers of default and thus each may have some advantage that justies its continued existence in the
marketplace. Thus, one would expect that issuers with greater ex-ante uncertainty are more likely to
apply for extra ratings, since the potential reduction of uncertainty is largest for them. Moreover, under
the information production hypothesis, an extra rating in agreement with the existing ratings would
reduce credit quality uncertainty and thereby lower credit spreads.
Second, the "rating shopping" eect can arise in a setting in which CRAs do not perfectly agree or
there is considerably uncertainty about credit quality, while issuers may have better information about
their own credit quality. In this case, issuers can seek to maximize their average rating by soliciting
multiple bids or following a stopping rule that chooses the rst rating agency whose rating equals or
exceeds the rm's own assessment of quality. Applying for private ratings and making these public
only if favorable, or deciding which CRA to use based on advice from an investment bank that has
knowledge about (gaming) each CRA's precise rating algorithms leads to similar patterns.
The rating shopping hypothesis thus predicts that issuers will only apply for any additional rating
if they think it will be an improvement. Therefore, additional ratings are on average better. Further, if
the issuer applies for an additional rating and this additional rating is an improvement, credit spreads
7should go down. This can be either because the additional rating is actually closer to the rm's true
credit quality or because it is not, but the market mistakenly takes the new rating at face value. In the
latter case, if the market is not fooled, there would be no incentive to engage in rating shopping.
The third explanation for multiple ratings is "regulatory certication". Financial regulation has
traditionally relied heavily on credit ratings to determine the suitability and riskiness of xed income
investments. For instance, bond ratings are used to score the quality of bonds in the investment
portfolios of insurance companies and banks and regulatory capital reserve requirements are determined
by this score. Ratings are also important in the structured nance market, the commercial paper market,
and the overnight repo market. They are used to determine "haircuts" at the discount window of the
central bank and for determining whether projects qualify for government assistance (see for example
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000)). They may be the basis for nancial contracting
between private parties, as the world witnessed in the case of AIG's rating downgrade that triggered
a need for increased collateral in its counterparty arrangements. This event underscores the enormous
potential impact of certication.
The most prominent distinction made in nancial regulation as it pertains to credit ratings is
whether an issue, issuer or structured product is "investment grade" (IG) or "high yield" (HY). In
particular, the most prevalent institutional rule used for classifying rated bonds is that, if an issue
has two ratings, only the worse rating can be used to classify the issue into investment-grade or non-
investment grade. However, if an issue has three ratings, the middle rating is used (see for example the
NAIC guidelines or the Basel II accord).1011 Therefore, if S&P and Moody's ratings are on opposite
sides of the investment grade boundary, the Fitch rating (assuming it is third rater) will decide into
which class the issue falls. This classication creates strong incentives for issuers trying to achieve
an investment grade rating. Thus, the IG-HY boundary is associated with a clear discontinuity in
institutional demand. Assuming a downward sloping demand curve, the lower demand for high yield
bond signicantly increases the cost of borrowing for those issuers (see Ellul, Jotikasthira and Lundblad
(2010) and Kisgen and Strahan (2009)).12
Under the regulatory certication hypothesis, the principal value of a CRA which systematically
gives better ratings (i.e., in our data Fitch) than the other CRAs (i.e., Moody's and S&P) is simply
that it helps satisfy the bright-line requirements of nancial regulation. A rating from this CRA could
be requested by issuers for whom the extra rating might make them qualify for an IG classication.
8In addition, issuers that consider themselves likely to experience a future downgrade from IG to HY
could opt for an extra rating for precautionary motives. This could lead to adverse selection eects, as
relatively weaker rms with higher credit spreads would then be more likely to apply for a Fitch rating.
Therefore, under the regulatory certication hypothesis, split ratings at the IG boundary by
Moody's and S&P should give signicant incentives to get an additional rating from Fitch. More-
over, an additional rating may provide a hedge against the regulatory and rule-based eects of possible
future rating downgrades, while also increasing the probability to reap regulatory benets from up-
grades. This eect should be more pronounced for issuers expecting to have more volatile ratings over
time.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) show that the information and regula-
tory certication hypotheses can be inherently related in a setting with two types of investors, in which
issues with a lower credit quality carry more uncertainty. Type I investors have a time-varying natural
demand for bonds and high research costs, and type II investors are without the natural demand but
have low research costs.13 Since type I investors are at an informational disadvantage relative to type
II investors, they will only invest in high credit quality securities for which the informational gain of
type II investors is small, i.e. in informationally insensitive assets, to avoid losses due to trading with
informed investors (see Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)). Typically, type II investors will provide liquid-
ity to this market to accommodate aggregate demand shocks. On the other end of the credit quality
spectrum, it is worthwhile for type II investors to generate the information needed.14 The region in the
middle could suer from a market breakdown if Type II investors only make money if they could prot
from informed trading with type I investors (as in Boot and Thakor (1993)).15
The importance of regulatory certication could be in preventing a market breakdown for interme-
diate quality bonds. In this setting, credit ratings can restore trading by reducing the uncertainty about
the value of information. Ratings will not only yield information about credit quality, but also about the
protability of research. If the conclusion is "no substantial information benet", then type I investors
would invest and type II would not bother to research. If the conclusion is "signicant information
benet", then type I investors would not invest and type II investors would invest to hold the security.
The IG-HY boundary is the prime candidate for the location on the credit quality spectrum where the
unconditionally expected gains from informational trading oset the costs for acquiring information.
This setting thus explains how a certication eect could arise in equilibrium.
9The regulatory certication and rating shopping hypotheses also have some possibly similar fea-
tures. In particular, while a rating shopping eect could be observed across the whole rating scale,
rating shopping incentives are likely strongest around the IG-HY boundary. Therefore, the distinction
between these two hypotheses merits discussion. The central prediction of rating shopping is that ad-
ditional ratings are, on average, optimistic relative to existing ratings. Thus, if rating shopping is most
important around the IG-HY boundary, the positive bias of the marginal rating should also be largest
there. In contrast, certication would give no reason to expect the additional CRA to be more positive
there as compared to other parts of the rating scale. Specically, certication predicts that if Moody's
and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG-HY boundary, it is signicantly more likely the issuer
pays for the (assumed marginal) Fitch rating. However, in contrast to the rating shopping hypothesis,
regulatory certication does not imply that this Fitch rating would be relatively (to Moody's and S&P
ratings) more positive than Fitch ratings at other part of the rating scale.
Second, the expectation of future rating changes decreases incentives for rating shopping but in-
creases the importance for regulatory certication. Rating shopping is more worthwhile if investors
expect that ratings will remain relatively stable, as in that case credit rating improvements are less
likely to be undone or become redundant. Under the regulatory certication hypothesis, (future ex-
pected) rating volatility creates a strong precautionary motive, motivating issuers to get an additional
rating to hedge against any possible future downgrade below IG.16 For this reason, additional ratings
may be associated with adverse selection, as issuers expecting more negative credit news may be more
likely to apply for such precautionary, additional ratings.
Each of the three explanations of multiple ratings (information production, rating shopping and
regulatory certication) thus has distinct empirical predictions, though dierent explanations can co-
exist. There are potential dierences in whether or not we would expect (i) credit spread eects of
agreeing ratings, (ii) credit spread eects of relatively optimistic ratings across the rating spectrum,
(iii) more uncertainty increasing the number of ratings and (iv) extra ratings when these could push
an issue into the IG category, (v) greater optimism of the additional rating around the boundary and
(vi) any positive or negative association between additional ratings and the likelihood of future rating
changes (see Table I for a summary).
[Table I about here]
Under information production, an additional rating that is in agreement with the prior ratings will
10reduce uncertainty and thereby lower credit spreads, while more uncertainty would make an additional
rating more worthwhile and therefore lead to more ratings.
Under rating shopping, more uncertainty would again lead to more ratings since initial ratings will
err more often. Additional ratings are likely to be better and better ratings would lower the credit
spread.17 Time variation in ratings makes shopping less worthwhile since the preferred outcome will be
less stable.
Under regulatory certication, a better extra rating would only lead to a lower spread at the
boundary but unconditionally an additional rating could be a manifestation of adverse selection (only
weaker issuers take an extra rating) and consequently be associated with higher credit spreads. Higher
time variation in ratings will give rise to a rating-hedging incentive and thereby increase the probability
of having an extra rating even for issues that are not directly at the boundary.
C Related Research
As asset pricing relies fundamentally on the production and dissemination of information, and this
process is endogenously determined, the related literature is vast. CRAs are only one type of research
and information provider to the securities markets. Much of the academic literature about the role
of research and information providers has focused on equity analysts rather than CRAs rating corpo-
rate debt. Studies on the equity markets have addressed a broad range of questions about research
providers, ranging from whether analysts' opinions convey value-relevant information, to whether con-
icts of interest and personal, strategic considerations inuence the nature of the information provided.
CRAs present a dierent institutional structure for analysis. While the same basic principles regarding
information production apply, CRAs have become integral to regulation pertaining to the credit market
(see also the discussion above).
Research about the role of CRAs is more limited. Theory has asked what role CRAs play in
the equilibrium pricing process. Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) highlight CRAs as a valuable
coordination device, in which CRAs provide little value-relevant information at the investment grade
boundary other than regulatory certication, but some useful valuation information about riskier issues.
Carlson and Hale (2005) point out that when each investor's optimal strategy is dependent on the
strategy followed by other investors, the public rating provided by the rating agency can serve to
11coordinate investor actions. Bannier and Tyrell (2006) introduce reputation and competition among
rating agencies. Under certain conditions, this will stimulate investors to search for private information
and will thus not only restore a unique equilibrium, but could even lead to a more ecient one.
Each of the three potential explanations for multiple ratings nds support in the existing academic
literature. On the issue of information production, a number of papers have looked at the eects of
rating changes on asset prices. For example, Kliger and Sarig (2000) use a renement in the Moody's
ratings system to show that rating changes channel information to the market that changes the value of
the debt. However, their results also suggest that this information leaves the aggregate company value
intact and thus only inuences the value of the debt relative to the value of the equity. G untay and
Hackbarth (2010) investigate the eect of analyst dispersion on credit spreads. They nd that higher
analyst dispersion is associated with higher credit spreads and conclude that this is probably due to
cash ow uncertainty.
Jewell and Livingston (1999) investigate whether ratings dier systematically across rating agencies.
They nd that the average Fitch rating is much better than Moody's and S&P ratings, but that this
eect disappears once they restrict their sample to bonds only rated by all three CRAs. They also
investigate whether rating shopping takes place, but nd no evidence. Covitz and Harrison (2003) look
at the trade-o that rating agencies face between income resulting from giving out favorable ratings and
expected future fees from customers resulting from reputation. They argue that reputation concerns
dominate and prevent CRAs from being "bribed" by customers. Bannier, Behr and G uttler (2010),
like Poon (2003) and Poon and Firth (2005), investigate possible adverse selection and hold-up in the
context of CRA and issuer incentives when CRAs issue ratings on an unsolicited basis.18
Inspired by the nancial crisis and the allegations addressed at CRAs, several recent theoretical
papers put forward models to motivate rating shopping. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) develop a model
where incentives for rating shopping increase as the complexity of the products increases. Bolton,
Freixas and Shapiro (2009) show that naive investors in the market may give incentives to CRAs to
inate their ratings and that in a duopoly, this gives extra incentives for rating shopping, which in turn
aggravates the problem. Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009) develop a theoretical model of rating
shopping and explore biases in ratings conditional upon heterogeneity across issuers in the extent to
which dierent raters agree.
In research most closely related to our own, Cantor and Packer (1997) also look for evidence of the
12information eect, the shopping eect and the certication eect. They use issuer-level ratings data
for the year 1994 to understand the motivation for using a third rating agency, but do not use bond
price and yield data to evaluate the market eects and price implications of the third rating. Like our
paper, they nd that the third CRA rating is systematically more optimistic. However, they fail to
nd evidence that the use of a third CRA is motivated by information, rating shopping or certication
eects. Since the time of their study, bond price data has become more widely available for research.
This allows us to conduct more powerful tests of the market response to the additional rating, and to
understand in greater detail how market participants interpret and use ratings.
Another closely related paper is Becker and Milbourn (2009), which considers the impact of the
major growth in market share of Fitch since 1989. They nd that more "competition leads to lower
quality in the ratings market: the incumbent agencies produce more issuer-friendly and less informative
ratings when competition is stronger." They explain this by applying the reputation model of Klein and
Leer (1981), considering CRA incentives to invest in information production in order to improve their
reputation. First, such incentives would be weaker if future rents are diminished as a result of increased
competition. Second, if demand is more elastic with greater competition, this may force CRAs to spend
less on expensive information production or tempt them more responsive to issuer demands, potentially
inducing rating shopping.
Brister, Kennedy and Liu (1994) nd evidence of a "super-premium" in yields of junk bonds due
to regulation around the IG boundary. Based on only S&P rating data, they nd that yields increase
disproportionally from a BBB to BB rating relative to the increase in default risk. Moreover, in a
recent paper, Kisgen and Strahan (2009) nd that credit spreads change in the direction of a Dominion
bond rating after the accreditation of Dominion as an NRSRO. They also nd that this eect is much
stronger around the IG boundary, indicating the importance of regulatory certication. Finally, Kisgen
(2006) and Kisgen (2009) investigate whether discrete rating boundaries inuence capital structure
decisions before and after rating changes respectively. Kisgen (2006) nds indeed evidence of reduced
debt issuance when ratings are close to an up- or downgrade, suggesting that credit ratings directly aect
capital structure decisions in a way not incorporated by traditional capital structure theories. Moreover,
this eect is especially pronounced around the IG boundary. Kisgen (2009) nds that managers lower
leverage after a rating downgrade, suggesting that managers target credit ratings rather than debt levels
or leverage ratios. This eect is again more pronounced around the IG boundary.
13With respect to the nature of the certication eect that we nd, our research relates to earlier
work on security design. Gorton and Penacchi (1990) set up a model that incentivizes uninformed
investors to transform risky assets into information-sensitive and information-insensitive parts, where
for the latter category they can avoid losses due to trading with informed investors. Boot and Thakor
(1993), on the other hand, develop a model in which security issuers lower funding costs by making
informed trading more protable. Our setup motivating the exploration of the regulatory certication
hypothesis uses key insights of both papers. In particular, the non-trading region in our setup is the
result of the absence of the uninformed investor, whereas the uninformed investor is needed to make
trading protable for the informed investor.
II Sample Construction and Methodology
A Main Measures and Controls
We measure uncertainty or opaqueness by Analyst Dispersion of the rm's earnings per share
or by the dispersion between Moody's and S&P ratings (like the IG-HY barrier dummies, we also
require stability of the dierence over at least 1 quarter).19 While rating dispersion is also a measure of
regulatory relevance, analyst dispersion is not, which will get us the required identication. We consider
two measures of rating dispersion: Notches of MSP Rating Dispersion, which is the absolute values of
the rating dierence between Moody's and S&P, and S&P and Moody's Disagree, which is a dummy
equal to one if their ratings are not the same.
Our main measure for the importance of regulations pertaining to the IG-HY boundary is denoted
by Fitch could push IG, which is a dummy variable equal to one if Moody's and S&P ratings are on
opposite sides of this boundary such that a Fitch rating would be decisive for the IG-HY classication.
In some regressions this measure is interacted with the outcome from Fitch.
To avoid spurious results due to omitted variables in our regressions, we correct for several issue and
issuer characteristics as well as for business cycle eects. On the issue level, we correct for callability
(using a dummy), size (oering size), and term structure eects (duration and convexity). On the
issuer level, we correct for credit risk (using the inputs of the Merton (1974) model, leverage and
volatility), protability (ROA), systematic risk (equity beta) and tangibility of assets (PPE/total book
14assets). Tangibility of assets is important since Moody's is the only CRA that also incorporates expected
recovery in their ratings. We also include R&D intensity (R&D expenditure over book assets) as an
additional control. R&D intensity can be associated with several pricing mechanisms in the corporate
bond markets. For example, higher R&D industries may have higher growth opportunities and therefore
lower credit spreads. On the other hand, R&D projects tend to be riskier than normal projects,
which may increase credit risk. We will control for the aggregate eect. In the credit spread changes
regressions, we also include time xed eects as controls for business cycle eects, since market wide
default probabilities, liquidity and risk premia are likely to vary with the business cycle.
B Data and Filters
For our main analysis, we use corporate bond pricing data from the TRACE database and merge
it with bond characteristic and rating data from FISD, equity data from CRSP, nancial data from
Compustat Industrial Quarterly and analyst data from I/B/E/S. Our time series ranges from July 1st
2002 up to December 31st 2008.20 The TRACE data contain all trades in TRACE-eligible bonds by
NASD members that were disseminated to the public. The dissemination to the public happened in
phases, resulting in an expanding universe of bonds. A more comprehensive description of the TRACE
database as well as the dissemination process is given in Downing, Underwood and Xing (2005).
We apply several lters to our dataset to remove bonds with special features that we do not want
to consider, and to remove seemingly erroneous entries.21 Next, we use the FISD characteristics to
match the trades to bond characteristics using CUSIPs.22 We only use senior unsecured notes and
bonds. We discard all bonds that are exchangeable, putable, convertible or pay-in-kind, that have a
non-xed coupon, that are subordinated, secured or guaranteed or are zero coupon bonds. Removing
callable bonds would reduce our sample substantially, so we leave those in, but correct for this feature
in our regressions using a dummy variable.
To diminish the impact of remaining data errors, we average the prices of all trades in each bond
by trading day. To reduce the eect of over-representation of very liquid bonds, we then make monthly
observations by only recording for each bond the last available daily average credit spread of every
month. We then construct quarterly observations by only looking at the last month every quarter. To
avoid issues with severe illiquidity and distressed debt as well as issues relating to non-linearity of credit
spreads with respect to rating scales, we remove all issues with an average (based on average Moody's,
15S&P) worse than B- (B3). For all bond trades in our sample, we calculate yields and credit spreads.
The benchmark rate that is used to construct credit spreads is based on an interpolation of the yields
of the two on-the-run government bonds bracketing the corporate bond with respect to duration.
Ratings data is obtained from FISD as provided by Mergent. The credit ratings data provider con-
rmed that due to changes in their data collecting procedures, the rating data before 2000 is incomplete.
This is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the number of rated bond issues each quarter by Moody's,
S&P and Fitch as well as the proportion of all bond issues in the sample rated by each of these CRAs
in a given quarter from 1994 - 2008. While the number of rated bond issues is steadily increasing over
time for all three CRAs, the sudden jump in the number of issues rated by S&P strongly suggests that
too many bond issues before 2000 have missing S&P ratings (i.e., issues had S&P ratings, but these are
missing from the database). Specically, the percentage of all issues rated by S&P equals 58% at the
end of 1999 and jumps to 94% in 2000, and remains above 85% until the end of the sample. There is
likewise a signicant, though smaller, jump in the percentage of bond issues rated by Fitch, from 29%
at the end of 1999 to 39% in 2000. As a result, for the analyses that do not require pricing data, we
use rating data from the second quarter of 2000 onwards. For our credit spread regressions the impact
of this will be minor, as TRACE only starts in the middle of 2002 and is dominated by data from 2004
onwards (when the number of bond issues contained in TRACE is greatly expanded).23
[Figure 1 about here]
We follow convention and use a numerical rating scale to convert ratings. Therefore, for Fitch
and S&P (with Moody's rating between parentheses), the numerical scores corresponding to the rating
notches are, respectively, 1 for AAA (Aaa), 2 for AA+ (Aa1), 3 for AA (Aa2), 4 for AA- (Aa3), 5 for
A+ (A1), 6 for A (A2), 7 for A- (A3), 8 for BBB+ (Baa1), 9 for BBB (Baa2), 10 for BBB- (Baa3),
11 for BB+ (Ba1), 12 for BB (Ba2), 13 for BB- (Ba3), 14 for B+ (B1), 15 for B (B2) and 16 for B-
(B3). However, we will still refer to more optimistic ratings, i.e. implying lower bankruptcy likelihood,
as 'higher' or 'better' ratings.
Equity market data is obtained from CRSP. We calculate (rolling window) historical daily idiosyn-
cratic volatility and betas to the CRSP value-weighted index based on half a year of historical trading
data. An AR(1) lter is used to lter out bid-ask bounces in daily closing prices. For an observation
to be included, we need at least 111 return observations in the last half year.
16Company data is obtained from Compustat Quarterly. We download data on rm size (total book
assets), debt (long and short term debt), protability (earnings), tangibility of assets (PPE), R&D
spending (obtained from Compustat Annual, since usually reported in the annual only) and industry
(SIC code). From these data, we construct a leverage variable (total debt over total book assets), a
tangibility of assets variable (PPE/total book assets), an R&D spending variable (R&D expenses/total
book assets and a dummy for missing values) and a protability variable (total earnings over total
assets). We also construct a 'SIC division' variable that is dened as the division that the 2-digit SIC
belongs to. Observations with SIC codes 9100 to 9999 (Public Administration) are excluded because of
possible implicit government guarantees.
Analyst forecast data on the annual EPS are obtained from I/B/E/S. We download summary data
including number of analysts, standard deviation of forecasts, minimum and maximum forecast from
the unadjusted le. Following G untay and Hackbarth (2010), we divide forecast dispersion measured
by analyst standard deviation by the share price to end up with dispersion per dollar invested.
We construct two samples with a quarterly frequency; a credit spread sample and a rating sample.
Because the rating sample does not require trade observations, this is a more inclusive panel, especially
for the less liquid bonds. Moreover, the period for which we have reliable data is also longer. Almost all
bonds in our nal sample are rated by both Moody's and S&P (see also Figure 1). Specically, about
95% of all bonds in our database with at least 2 ratings are rated by both S&P and Moody's. This
lack of cross-sectional variation in having an S&P or Moody's rating means that we can only study the
implications for having Fitch as a third rating.
Accordingly, we remove from our sample all bond issues that do not have ratings from both S&P
and Moody's. For this sample of bond issues rated by both Moody's and S&P and using quarterly
observations for 2000-2008, about 68% of observations have a Fitch rating. As a result, the main
focus of our paper will be to consider the 'marginal' role of Fitch ratings, while controlling for S&P
and Moody's ratings. Table II presents summary statistics for the quarterly credit spread sample.
For completeness, Internet Appendix Table IA.I presents summary statistics for the quarterly ratings
sample. Figure 2 presents the average credit spreads over our sample by rating category. There is very
signicant variation, especially starting the second half of 2007.
[Table II and Figure 2 about here]
17III Empirical Results
A Rating Dierences and Rating Information
Following Cantor and Packer (1997), we show that Fitch ratings are on average signicantly more
optimistic than both Moody's and S&P ratings for the same issue in the same quarter and present
the results in Table III and Figure 3. S&P is also, in general, more optimistic than Moody's but the
dierence is much smaller (both for the full sample and for the Fitch-rated sample alone).
[Table III and Figure 3 about here]
Next, we investigate the bond market reaction to the rating updates issued. We are most specically
interested in the informational content of Fitch rating changes compared to the informational content of
Moody's or S&P rating updates. To minimize issues relating to selection, we limit ourselves for this test
to the sample that is rated by all three CRAs. Table IV presents the results of regressing end-of-quarter
credit spread changes on dummy variables for these up- and downgrades for each CRA. All regressions
on credit spread changes in the paper use standard errors clustered by issuer (unless stated otherwise)
and include a large number of controls with time xed eects.
[Table IV about here]
The credit spread change regressions in columns 1 - 3 of Table IV indicate that all CRAs appear
to be highly informative in single CRA specications. However, in the joint specication in column
7, only S&P and Moody's rating updates seem to contain relevant information associated with credit
spread changes. For example, Moody's and S&P downgrades, respectively, are related to credit spread
increases of 8 and 17 basis points, respectively. However, Fitch rating updates are not statistically
signicantly associated with changes in credit spreads. In joint signicance tests, we can reject that
Fitch rating downgrade coecients are equal to S&P or Moody's rating downgrade coecients, though
not for the equivalent rating upgrade coecients. When we restrict ourselves to the upper end of the
rating spectrum (see column 5, using only issues with average rating of A- or better), Fitch seems to
contain no information even in the single CRA specication. We cannot reject that the reactions to
Fitch upgrades and downgrades are statistically dierent from each other in the presence of the up and
downgrades from the other CRAs, while we can for Moody's and S&P (see Internet Appendix Table
IA.IX for these tests on Moody's and S&P).
18However, rating changes of Fitch at the IG boundary do matter, i.e. when Moody's and S&P
ratings are on opposite sides of the IG-HY boundary and Fitch could be the tie-breaker and change the
classication of the bond issue into IG versus HY. Economically, the credit spread change associated
with Fitch changing the classication to IG rather than HY is about 49 basis points in the full sample
(column 4, p-value of 2.82%), about 41 basis points in a sample of bonds rated BBB+ or worse (column
6, p-value of 5.87%), and again about 41 basis points in the full sample controlling for Moody's and S&P
rating updates (column 8, p-value of 6.07%). These results are consistent with a regulatory certication
eect and inconsistent with an information eect.
Table V presents regressions of price reactions to Fitch additions after the bond has been in our
sample for at least one quarter without a Fitch rating but with both Moody's and S&P ratings. Here,
the sample consists of all issues rated by both Moody's and S&P, and thus no longer conditions on
also having a Fitch rating as for the sample used for Table V. The subsequent table considers selection
directly in modeling the addition of a Fitch rating using Cox proportional hazard model regressions. If
selection eects were very strong, one could expect that the event of a Fitch addition by itself would be
associated with a change in credit spreads. For example, if adverse selection would lead only rms with
poorer prospects to request a (generally more optimistic) Fitch rating, we would expect to see a Fitch
rating addition to be associated with an increase in the credit spread. However, column 1 in Table V
indicates that a Fitch addition is not related to any change in credit spreads at all (coecient of -2.28
basis points with a t-statistic of -0.65). This lack of any eect mitigates selection issues, although we
do nd a mild adverse selection eect in a robustness test in Internet Appendix Table IA.6 where the
sample is restricted to the pre-crisis period.
[Table V about here]
Table V also fails to show any evidence in favor of an information production eect. When a Fitch
rating is added that conrms the average Moody's and S&P rating, this does not lead to a signicantly
lower credit spread (see columns 2 - 7). Neither does the interaction of the added Fitch rating with
measures of uncertainty show any signicant eect (see column 6 with the Analyst Dispersion interaction
and column 7 with the 'Notches of MSP Rating Dispersion' interaction). The negative (positive) sign
of a Fitch rating added that is better (worse) than the average Moody's and S&P rating is consistent
with rating shopping and information production, but is not statistically signicant. Likewise, the
coecients on Fitch Added, Better and Fitch Added, Worse are not statistically dierent from each
19other.
However, columns 3 - 5 provide strong evidence in favor of the regulatory certication hypothesis.
In the cases for which Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG-HY boundary, a Fitch
rating added that makes the issue qualify for IG is associated with a substantial drop in the credit
spread. The dierence between Fitch classifying such bond issues as IG rather than HY is associated
with a dierence in about 41 basis points (p-value of 3.23%) in the credit spread. This result is robust
to using either the whole sample or only issues with average Moody's and S&P ratings between BBB+
and BB- (column 3 and 4, respectively) and to double clustering credit spread changes in both issuer
and time dimensions.24
B Adding a Fitch Rating
This section considers the selection of Fitch as the third rater (all bond issues in our sample
are restricted to be rated by both Moody's and S&P). In Table VI, we use Cox proportional Hazard
regressions to model getting a Fitch rating, including variables that may be related to each of the three
hypotheses. In the Cox model, an 'exit' is dened as the event of getting a Fitch rating. The Cox model
has the convenient property that one can focus on the relative rank of each subject in the cross-section
by ignoring the baseline hazard rate and optimizing the partial likelihood function only. The baseline
hazard rate can be separated out (as in any proportional hazard model), and therefore needs no specic
parametric form that can inuence our results.
[Table VI about here]
In our analysis, we employ several proxies for information uncertainty: (i) the absolute dierence
in number of notches dierence between the Moody's and S&P ratings and a dummy equal to one if the
S&P and Moody's ratings are dierent, (ii) idiosyncratic volatility of daily stock returns, (iii) equity
analyst dispersion. We further include variables related to the relative importance of ratings, such as
leverage, rm size and issue oering size. A positive coecient on the variables relating to information
uncertainty could be interpreted as evidence for information or rating shopping eects.
We investigate the certication eect by including the Fitch Could Break Tie dummy which equals
one if Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG-HY boundary. This approach exploits
the fact that regulations typically prescribe that if an issue has three ratings, the median rating should
20be used to determine the issue's rating, while the worst rating should be used if there are two ratings.
Therefore, if Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG-HY boundary, an additional Fitch
rating would be decisive about whether or not the issue becomes investment grade. As a robustness
check, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite
sides of the A- boundary. The A- boundary obviously does not have the same regulatory importance
as the investment grade boundary, such that its coecient would be expected to be insignicant.
Finally, we add several other controls that inuence bond prices, such as rating group dummies
based on the average Moody's and S&P ratings, whether the issue is redeemable, the maturity, liqui-
dation values (using proxies for xed assets and R&D expenses), the maturity left and the square of
the maturity left, and always include industry dummies. Standard errors are again clustered by issuer.
The sample consists of all issues that are rated by both Moody's and S&P over 2000 - 2008.
Empirically, we nd that all the coecients on variables related to uncertainty (i.e., analyst dis-
persion, idiosyncratic equity volatility and a dummy indicating Moody's and S&P rating dierences as
well as a variable measuring the size of the dispersion in notches) are either insignicant, or have the
wrong (i.e., negative) sign for an information or rating shopping eect. For example, we nd that issues
with greater idiosyncratic volatility are less likely to get a Fitch rating, even though further information
production may be relatively useful for those issues. Thus, we nd no support in the data for either
the information or the rating shopping eects.
On the other hand, column 1, 2 and 5 show that if an issue has Moody's and S&P ratings on opposite
sides of the IG-HY boundary, the (conditional) likelihood that the issue gets a Fitch rating increases
considerably. The economic signicance of the coecient on Fitch could push IG is considerable. For
example, the coecient of 0.717 in column 1 implies that issues where Fitch is the tie-breaker have
about twice (2.05 = exp(0.717)) the hazard rate, i.e. are about twice as likely to get a Fitch rating.
We interpret this as strong evidence in favor of a certication eect: it is precisely in those cases where
the marginal rating (i.e., Fitch) is decisive for the critical regulation classication of the bond issue into
investment and non-investment grade, that Fitch is much more likely to (be asked to) give a rating.
The downside of the Cox regression is that it basically discards any observations that already have
a Fitch rating, thereby ignoring some potentially useful information. Therefore, we try to corroborate
the results that regulatory certication is an important explanation for having a Fitch rating by directly
modeling having a Fitch rating using a logistic regression. Estimates of this regression can be found
21in Internet Appendix Table IA.VII, which conrms that Fitch could push IG is strongly positively
associated with having a Fitch rating, while none of the three main measures of uncertainty provide
any evidence for the information production hypothesis. With a 12% higher probability to have a Fitch
rating if the other two CRAs split at the IG boundary, these results are also economically large. Internet
Appendix Table A.VIII shows that these results are robust with double clustering.
C CRA Performance
This subsection investigates the general performance of each CRA in default prediction. The main
purpose is to corroborate our previous nding that in general, Fitch rating changes or Fitch rating
additions are not associated with credit spread changes, unless Fitch is the tie-breaker around the IG-
HY boundary. If so, we would expect that Fitch rating dierences to Moody's and S&P ratings are
not signicantly improving default prediction. We perform two tests. First, we run logistic regressions
of issue defaults on one-year lagged credit ratings. Second, we calculate accuracy ratios of the one-
year ahead default prediction (i.e., Gini coecients) to measure rating performance of all three CRAs.
This method is also employed by the CRAs themselves for self-evaluation in their annual default study.
However, since sample periods and rated populations typically dier among CRAs, the self reported
results are not useful for comparative purposes.
The sample we use for this analysis is dierent from the sample we use for our other analysis.
Since defaults are relatively rare events, we maximize the size of our sample by incorporating as many
issues as possible. Therefore, we include bonds from issuers for which we have no Compustat, CRSP
or IBES data as well as bonds with ratings worse than B-/B3. We still restrict ourselves to only
senior unsecured US bonds in US dollars. As before, we exclude bonds that are putable, exchangeable,
convertible, perpetual, asset backed or oating rate. We collect ratings for all these bonds in FISD that
are rated by all three CRAs between 2000 and 2008 and can be matched with the Moody's Default
Risk Services Corporate database containing issuer default events. To avoid over-weighting issuers with
many bonds outstanding that are likely to default at the same time, we weight each bond at each point
in time with the inverse of the number of bonds outstanding for its issuer. 25
Table VII shows the results of our default prediction study. Panel A shows that default prediction
is best for Moody's and worst for Fitch. This ranking holds true in terms of the pseudo R2, as well as
to how much each CRA adds in default prediction relative to the others. First, we can compare the
22pseudo R2 in exible specications with dummies for the various notched rating categories (i.e., AAA,
AA+, AA, AA-, and up to B-).26 The pseudo R2 for Moody's is highest (37%, see column 1), followed
by S&P (33%, see column 3) and nally comes Fitch (32%, see column 5). In columns 2, 4 and 6, we
instead use a linear rating specication of the CRA ratings in notches, i.e., '1' corresponds to AAA, '2'
to AAA-, etc. The resulting pseudo R2s are quite similar, with pseudo R2 of 37%, 33% and 31% for
Moody's, S&P and Fitch, respectively, which suggests that the linear specication is quite reasonable.
[Table VII about here]
In subsequent columns, we compare dierent pairs of ratings: Moody's and Fitch ratings in columns
7 - 8, S&P and Fitch ratings in columns 9 - 10 and Moody's and S&P ratings in column 11 - 12. For
each comparison, we nd pseudo R2 is not increased by adding the CRA with a lower pseudo R2 in
columns 1 - 6. For example, the pseudo R2 in columns 7 - 8 combining Moody's and Fitch ratings equals
36.7%, basically identical to the pseudo R2 of Moody's ratings by themselves of 36.6% in column 2 but
higher than the pseudo R2 of Fitch ratings by themselves of 30.8% in column 6. The dierence between
Fitch and Moody's ratings is further in insignicant in column 8, while it is signicant in column 7.
Thus, a Moody's rating adds predictive power to a Fitch rating while the reverse is not the case. We
show the same pattern in columns 9 and 10 for the comparison of Fitch with S&P. Taken together,
these results suggest that conditional on a Fitch rating, Moody's or S&P ratings provide signicant
additional information for default prediction one-year ahead, while the reverse is not the case.
Consistent with Panel A, the accuracy ratios (i.e., Gini coecients) are highest for Moody's and
lowest for Fitch. In Figure 4, we plot the cumulative fraction of default over the next year against the
cumulative fraction of ratings (from worst to best); this curve is also called a Cumulative Accuracy
Power curve (CAP-curve). Here, a smaller area in the upper left-hand corner of the graph implies
greater prediction accuracy. The accuracy ratios are the fractions of the areas underneath the plotted
lines minus the area under the 45 degree line multiplied by two, such that the accuracy ratio converges
to 1 as prediction accuracy improves and is equal to zero if ratings are assigned in a completely random
fashion. The graph shows that Fitch line is clearly below (and is thus worse than) the other two over
most of the rating spectrum.
[Figure 4 about here]
More formally, we nd that accuracy ratio of Moody's (77.9%) and S&P (76.5%) outperform Fitch
23(71.8%), and that these dierences are statistically signicant. There is no statistical signicant dier-
ence between Moody's and S&P accuracy ratios (with standard errors calculated using a Jackknife with
re-sampling based on issuer). We conclude that these conrm the lack of support for the information
hypothesis in our data.27
D Further Explorations of Regulatory Certication and Rating Shopping
Arguably, rating shopping is more worthwhile around the IG boundary, thus leading to more
rating shopping at the boundary. On the other hand, under a certication eect, even for issuers at
the boundary that should not qualify for IG and thus expect a worse Fitch rating, the possibility of
achieving the IG status by sheer luck may be a motivation to apply for an additional Fitch rating.
Thus, at the boundary, one would expect more positive (optimistic) added Fitch ratings than elsewhere
in the rating spectrum if there is rating shopping.
As a proxy for the level of optimism in the additional, third Fitch rating, we consider whether or
not the additional Fitch rating leads to a regulatory gain, dened as the dierence between 'worst of
two' to 'medium of 3' ratings.
Table VIII presents results of logistic regressions of regulatory gain on dummies indicating the
location of a bond in the rating spectrum. Observations are conditioned to have split ratings from
Moody's and S&P as otherwise regulatory gain is impossible. The table provides some suggestive
evidence that the (additional) Fitch rating is more optimistic around the HY-IG boundary and thus
that some rating shopping might be going on around the IG-HY boundary.28
[Table VIII about here]
Moreover, the regulatory gain from the third, additional Fitch rating is largest if that Fitch rating
breaks the tie at the HY-IG boundary. If the Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the
HY-IG boundary, a regulatory gain is about 20% more likely (see columns 1 and 2). Fitch ratings being
generally more optimistic, the likelihood of a regulatory gain due to a Fitch rating addition in case
of Moody's and S&P ratings disagreement is about 65% on average. As a result, this likelihood of a
regulatory gain climbs to about 85% if the Fitch rating could change the HY-IG regulatory classication
(controlling for everything else).
Next, one of the predictions in Table I was that of a precautionary extra rating. Given the
24demand shock of being below the IG boundary, issuers may want to hedge the risk of becoming HY
by taking an extra rating due to a precautionary motive. Unfortunately, ratings are too persistent
to empirically estimate the frequency of rating changes reliably from the rating history. However,
due to data constraints and the forward looking nature of this eect, we can perform the analysis of
this precautionary eect the other way around, i.e. we estimate the association of the probability of
undergoing a future rating change with a dummy for having a Fitch rating and several controls for
opacity and volatility. The results can be found in Table IX. Indeed, we nd that having future rating
changes is positively related to having a Fitch rating, over and beyond the usual measures of volatility
and opacity. Having a Fitch rating is associated with a quarterly transition probability that is 1.0% to
1.28% higher, which is economically sizable (Moody's and S&P average transition frequencies are 5.2%
and 5.5% respectively).
[Table IX about here]
If the certication eect arises naturally in a setting with information sensitive and insensitive
investors, one would expect a very liquid IG market and an illiquid HY market. Moreover, issues
around the middle region should have a low liquidity that can be restored if Fitch makes an issue
qualify for information insensitive. However, if Fitch gives a HY rating, an issue at the boundary will
truly fall into the no-trade region and have an exceptionally low liquidity. Table X conrms these
predictions empirically. Bonds that qualify for HY based on their Moody's and S&P rating have a
substantially lower turnover than those that qualify for IG. However, if Fitch pulls them into the IG
category, this eect is compensated. On the other hand, if Fitch could pull them into the IG category
but rather gives a HY rating, liquidity drops dramatically, even after correcting for issue and time xed
eects as well as the on-the-run eect (corrected for by age).
[Table X about here]
IV Conclusion
Credit ratings play an important role in the capital markets. They are used by regulators and
market participants to establish capital requirements and, in a legal setting, to provide safe harbor for
duciaries. This widespread dependency upon credit ratings has the potential to inuence how credit
rating agencies (CRAs) are used by issuers and how their ratings are evaluated by the market. A number
25of theories have been proposed regarding how such dependency will aect the use of multiple CRAs,
the type of rating issued by CRAs depending upon their strategic position, and nally about how the
market interprets the informational output of rating agencies though the price formation process.
In this paper, we utilize bond issue credit ratings, characteristics and market prices to evaluate
some of these proposed theories. We test three hypotheses: (i) "Information Production," whether the
third rater adds value-relevant information, (ii) "Rating Shopping" and (iii) "Regulatory Certication,"
in particular whether a third agency plays the role of tie-breaker at the boundary of being classied
as investment-grade versus high-yield. The certication eect could arise naturally as an equilibrium
outcome in a setting with information-sensitive and insensitive investors and assets along the lines of
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993). An extra rating indicating the potential
value to be gained from research could (partially) resolve a no-trade region around the IG-HY boundary.
Our empirical work contains several results. First, we nd that signicant dierences exist across
multiple credit ratings of the same bond issue at the same point of time, with Fitch ratings on average
clearly more positive than Moody's and S&P ratings. This is consistent with Fitch playing a strategic
role that reduces the threat that the other two CRAs could withhold investment-grade ratings and
extract compensation for regulatory certication, i.e., Fitch being available to push bonds into the
investment grade classication when the other two rms may disagree.
Bond price data reveal how the market regards a rating by the third agency. In general, credit
rating agencies provide useful information to the market about credit risk. However, we nd no robust
evidence that Fitch ratings provide additional information incorporated in bond prices, relative to the
information already contained in the Moody's and S&P ratings. Thus even though Fitch ratings are
on average clearly better (i.e. more optimistic) than Moody's and S&P ratings, there seems little
information contained in these ratings that the bond market incorporates. This is inconsistent with
both the information and rating shopping hypotheses.
We nd strong evidence that Fitch ratings have a regulatory certication eect. The likelihood of
getting a Fitch rating is strongly associated with Moody's and S&P ratings being on opposite sides of
the investment grade boundary. This suggests that in equilibrium, Fitch ratings are sought as a kind
of 'tie-breaker' in these cases. We nd some suggestive evidence that Fitch ratings are relatively better
if the Fitch rating is decisive for the investment grade classication, as compared to all other Fitch
ratings. In particular, we nd evidence that if Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the
26HY-IG boundary, the additional Fitch rating is more likely than otherwise to lead to an improvement
in the regulatory rating classication, i.e., in this particular case to the IG classication. Overall, this
provides some evidence of rating shopping around the HY-IG boundary, or the marginal rating being
used for regulatory arbitrage.
In the cross-section of bond prices, we nd that the certication eect is strongly associated with
credit spreads. Controlling for the average Moody's and S&P rating, for issues where Moody's and
S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the investment grade boundary, a Fitch rating pushing the issue
into the investment grade category has credit spreads that are about 41 basis points lower than if the
Fitch rating would push the issue into the high yield category. Moreover, bond issues experiencing
relatively many rating changes by Moody's and S&P are more likely to have a Fitch rating, suggesting
a precautionary motive of getting a Fitch rating. These results combined with additional results on for
example the liquidity of the bonds are consistent with a third CRA arising as a tie-breaker in equilibrium
to resolve a no-trade region in a setting with information-sensitive and insensitive investors and assets.
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28Notes
1For smaller corporate bond issues, Fitch is occasionally one of two raters. However, almost all bonds in our sample
are rated by both Moody's and S&P (see also Figure 1). Specically, about 95% of all bonds in our database with at
least 2 ratings are rated by both S&P and Moody's. This lack of cross-sectional variation in having an S&P or Moody's
rating means that we can only study the implications for having Fitch as a third rating. We remove from our sample all
bond issues that do not have ratings from both S&P and Moody's. For this sample of bond issues rated by both Moody's
and S&P and using quarterly observations for 2000-2008, about 60% of observations have a Fitch rating. As a result, the
main focus of our paper will be to consider the 'marginal' role of Fitch ratings, while controlling for S&P and Moody's
ratings. Throughout the paper, we only consider the three major Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), ignoring all others, as
they are much smaller at this point.
2The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is the organization of state insurance regulators.
3For rms with split Moody's and S&P ratings, 13% of Fitch additions are such boundary cases.
4There is some evidence that regulators are concerned about such 'ratings arbitrage.' See e.g. proposals for the new
Basel II accord made in July 2008: "If [an issue] has multiple ratings, the applicable rating would be the lowest rating. This
approach for determining the applicable rating diers from the New Accord. In the New Accord, if an exposure has two
ratings, a banking organization would apply the lower rating to the exposure to determine the risk weight. If an exposure
has three or more ratings, the banking organization would use the second lowest rating to risk weight the exposure. The
agencies believe that the proposed approach, which is designed to mitigate the potential for ratings arbitrage, more reliably
promotes safe and sound banking practices." Source: http://www.occ.treas.gov/fr/fedregister/73fr43982.pdf.
5Indeed, some ratings have a point-in-time perspective, whereas others (including the three major CRAs) employ
a 'through-the-cycle' vision. Similarly, while some rating agencies aim to reect cross-sectional variation in default
probabilities (like S&P and Fitch), others aim to also incorporate loss given default and reect dispersion in expected loss
(like Moody's).
6This rule is likely to be revised in the future.
7See http://www.occ.treas.gov/law/basel.htm for an overview of legal and regulatory news pertaining to the Basel
accords from the Oce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
8Campbell and Taksler (2003) report that about one third of all corporate bonds are held by insurance companies,
about 15% by pension and retirement funds, 5% to 10% by mutual funds and 5% by commercial banks; thus, approximately
60% of this market is held by institutions that qualify for ratings based constraints.
9The Barclays US corporate IG Index Factsheet is available at https://ecommerce.barcap.com/indices/index.dxml.
10Quoting the NAIC report: "A security rated and monitored by two NRSROs is assigned the lowest of the two ratings.
A security rated by three or more NRSROs is ordered according to their NAIC equivalents and the rating falling second
lowest is selected, even if that rating is equal to that of the rst lowest." This report can be found at http://www.naic.org/
documents/committees_e_rating_agency_comdoc_naic_staff_report_use_of_ratings.doc. See also Basel Committee
29on Banking Supervision (2000). If an issue has only one rating, that rating will be used. However, several regulations
prohibit institutional investors to invest in issues with only one rating.
11There have been some time series changes in NAIC regulations, but these changes not signicantly aected the validity
of our 'tie-breaking' assumption at any point in time, i.e., that the worst of two ratings or the medium of 3 ratings is
used for NAIC classications. First, the NAIC issues its own ratings and 1994 to 2001 the Securities Valuation Oce
(SVO) of the NAIC would assign an NAIC rating to each security. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ratings from
CRAs were critical, but that the nal decision was at the NAIC analyst's discretion. In 2001 a Provisional Exemption
rule was introduced under which bonds with standard features would be assigned a NAIC 1 or NAIC2 rating (i.e,
allowing smaller capital charges than HY) automatically if at least one CRA would rate it A- or higher at least two
CRAs rate it BBB- or higher without the interference of an SVO analyst. Eectively, this came down to a middle
rating rule (see http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_research_SVO_jan01cc.pdf). Second, on January 1, 2004, the
NAIC implemented a Filing Exemption rule, stating that any issue rated by one or more CRAs would be assigned an
NAIC rating based on the CRA equivalent rating. In case of split ratings, the 'second best' rating would be taken (see
http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_FE_FAQ.pdf). Third and nally, this 'second best' rule was changed to a 'second
worst' rule in 2007. However, both, the 'second best' as well as the 'second worst' rule eectively boil down to 'worst
of 2 if only 2 and medium of 3 ratings' rule in view of the low market share of the other CRAs besides the big three.
Our contact within the NAIC SVO argued that these guidelines were in general well adhered to by the individual state
regulators.
12See further Chernenko and Sunderam (2009) on the eects of the market segmentation due to credit ratings on bond
issuance and investments.
13For simplicity, one could think about type I investors as commercial banks, insurance companies and pension funds,
where the natural demand for bonds stems from the random ow of deposits and claims, and type II investors as hedge
funds and proprietary trading desks.
14Type II investors do not suer from the negative eect to utility due to uncertainty; if they need to trade due to
liquidity shocks, they trade amongst themselves on an equally informed basis.
15For type I investors, the losses due to informed trading prevent them from investing in this region; they realize that
they are at an information disadvantage and thus do not enter this market, while the limited gains for type II investors
do not make it worthwhile for them to produce costly information in this intermediate region.
16An alternative way to hedge is increasing the average maturity of their debt. However, this is costly since in this
region of the rating spectrum, the term structure of credit spreads is typically upward sloping.
17This is not necessarily true when a rating agency rates too optimistically, but if credit spreads do not decrease, there
seems to be no benet and thus no reason for rating shopping.
18Adverse selection may explain why unsolicited ratings are on average worse than solicited ones. That is, rms that
receive a favorable unsolicited rating do not apply for a solicited rating anymore, whereas rms with an unfavorable unso-
licited rating pay for another (solicited) opinion. On the other, CRAs could create a holdup problem by underestimating
the creditworthiness of companies in their unsolicited ratings to prompt those companies to seek (improved) paid-for
30solicited rating subsequently. The general conclusion of this literature is that for industrials unsolicited ratings are lower
than solicited ratings, and that this dierence is largely due to adverse selection of debt issuers. There seems to be some
evidence for holdup by CRAs, but this is concentrated mainly on nancials. Our dataset does not include information
on unsolicited ratings for US corporate bonds, so this paper does not address these ndings directly. However, several
papers report a low incidence rate of unsolicited ratings, like for example Partnoy (2006), who estimates an incidence rate
of approximately 1%.
19To avoid capturing timing mismatches between (multiple) rating transitions, we require that any particular ratings
situation has existed for at least a quarter. This will also mitigate concerns about not correcting for credit watches and
credit outlooks (for these variables our data are too sparse to be useful). Time variation in ratings is hard to measure,
since ratings are rather persistent. Therefore, we do not explicitly include time variation in ratings as a variable in our
regressions but analyze the correlation between having a Fitch rating and the likelihood of experiencing rating changes.
20The TRACE database starts in July 2002.
21We remove all trades that include commission, have a settlement period of more than 5 days, and all trades that are
canceled. Trades that are corrected, we correct. Moreover, we remove all trades for which we have a negative reported
yield, since these will be mainly driven by implicit option premia in the yield. We also found trades with a settlement
date later than or equal to the maturity date and removed those bonds. Furthermore, we found several records that we
suspect to be duplicates, resulting from both parties involved in a trade reporting to the system. Thus, we lter out
duplicate trades that have identical prices, trading time and volume. Moreover, some of the yields changes are extremely
high or low. We remove trades with credit spreads of more than 1000 bps and credit spread changes of more than 500bps.
Finally, we deleted all issues with duration of less than 1 year.
22CUSIPs of non-exchange traded bonds do not change in case of mergers, acquisitions, etc (see http://www.cusip.com).
23FISD conrmed that from mid-2003 on, they have been using automated rating feeds from the CRAs, whereas before
that time these ratings were collected by hand, increasing the potential for data errors in the earlier period.
24As suggested by Cantor and Packer (1997), ratings by Fitch could be inated. To address this issue, we repeat the
analysis of Table V where we correct all Fitch ratings by one notch (except for the tie breaking at the boundary). The
results can be found in Internet Appendix Table IA.II. These results are consistent with the results reported in Table V.
Furthermore, we show similar results in levels in Internet Appendix Table IA.IV, exploiting also observations that already
had a Fitch rating when they entered the sample. If anything, results are even stronger since an agreeing Fitch rating is
associated with a higher credit spread. The eect of certication is statistically and economically very similar. Finally,
one might be concerned that the large movements in credit spreads at the onset of the crisis might drive any of these
results. Internet Appendix Tables IA.V and A.VI (showing the results on the sample ending in June 2007) indicate that
this is not the case.
25That is, the weighting is done in a Weighted Least Squared sense.
26For all non-linear regressions in the paper we report McFadden (1973) Pseudo R2s.
27As a robustness check, we also investigate the predictive power of Fitch in case i) Moody's and S&P disagree and ii)
31when it breaks a tie at the IG/HY boundary. Results can be found in Internet Appendix Table A.III. For disagreements,
the additional predictive power of Fitch has the right sign, but is not signicant at conventional levels. Also the tie-
breaking role around the IG/HY boundary does not yield any signicant eect and has coecients in the same direction
no matter whether Fitch pulls over or under the boundary.
28We thank our NBER discussant, Michael Brennan, for suggesting this test.
32Table I
Empirical Predictions
The various empirical predictions of the three hypotheses are summarize in the table below, where ' '
indicates that the implication is not supported and '+' means it is supported.






(i) Additional agreeing rating lowers credit spreads +    
(ii) Additional relatively optimistic rating lowers
credit spreads (also away from IG-HY boundary)
+ + Only at IG
boundary
(iii) Uncertainty uniformly increases # of ratings + + possible
(iv) Additional rating especially if that could push
the issue to an investment grade classication
possible possible +
(v) Additional rating more optimistic (especially
around IG boundary)
  + Only for strate-
gic CRA
(vi) Additional rating associated with higher ex-
pected time variation in ratings
+   +
33Table II
Summary Statistics for Credit Spreads Sample
The table presents summary statistics and a brief description for the sample of bonds issues that have
both a Moody's and an S&P rating in the quarterly credit spreads sample for 2002 - 2008.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Explanation
Fitch Could Break Tie 44,366 0.032 0.18 0 1 Moodys and S&P on opposite
sides of the IG-HY boundary
Fitch Rated 44,366 0.68 0.47 0 1 Rated by Fitch
Fitch Rating 44,366 5.04 4.17 0 16 Fitch Rating
Moodys Rating 44,366 7.33 3.6 1 18 Moody's Rating
S&P Rating 44,366 7.17 3.55 1 17 S&P Rating
Fitch makes IG 44,366 0.016 0.12 0 1 Fitch pulls IG
Fitch denies IG 44,366 0.0066 0.081 0 1 Fitch denies IG
Notches of MSP Rating
Dispersion
44,366 0.43 0.69 0 12 Absolute value of MSP rating
dierence
Moodys Upgrade 44,366 0.027 0.16 0 1 Moody's upgrade (common sam-
ple)
Moodys Downgrade 44,366 0.034 0.18 0 1 Moody's downgrade (common
sample)
S&P Upgrade 44,366 0.029 0.17 0 1 S&P upgrade (common sample)
S&P Downgrade 44,366 0.038 0.19 0 1 S&P downgrade (common sam-
ple)
Fitch Upgrade 44,366 0.017 0.13 0 1 Fitch upgrade (common sample)
Fitch Downgrade 44,366 0.024 0.15 0 1 Fitch downgrade (common sam-
ple)
Fitch Added, Better 44,366 0.0039 0.062 0 1 Fitch added and < MSP
Fitch Added, Equal 44,366 0.005 0.071 0 1 Fitch added and = MSP
Fitch Added, Worse 44,366 0.0003 0.017 0 1 Fitch added and > MSP
Credit Spread 44,366 172.71 141.72 0.12 999.86 Credit spread
Change in Credit Spread 44,366 18.39 68.33 -478.36 498.42 Credit spread change
Redeemable 44,366 0.69 0.46 0 1 callable
Log of Oering Amount 44,366 12.03 1.88 0 15.42 log oering amount
Duration 44,366 6.32 3.72 1 18.91 duration
Idios. Vol. 44,366 0.016 0.0084 0.0012 0.11 idiosyncratic stock volatility
Log of Total Assets 44,366 10.34 1.55 5.34 13.65 log of total assets
Leverage 44,366 0.34 0.17 0 5.77 leverage
ROA 44,366 0.014 0.02 -0.46 0.26 ROA
PPE / Total Assets 44,196 0.36 0.24 0 0.95 PPE/total assets
R&D / Total Assets 44,366 0.012 0.023 0 0.23 R&D/total assets
R&D Missing 44,366 0.43 0.5 0 1 R&D missing
Analyst Dispersion 43,923 0.0033 0.013 0 1.1 analyst dispersion
Beta 44,366 0.95 0.39 -0.25 4.21 equity beta
Convexity 44,366 53.83 56.58 1 357.47 convexity




Average rating dierences for issues simultaneously rated by multiple CRAs, measured in rating notches,
and split up by rating categories. Rating categories are dened by average Moody's and S&P ratings.
We follow convention and use the numerical rating scale to convert ratings. For Fitch and S&P (with
Moody's rating in parentheses), the numerical scores corresponding to the rating notches are, respec-
tively, 1 for AAA (Aaa), 2 for AA+ (Aa1), 3 for AA (Aa2), 4 for AA- (Aa3), 5 for A+ (A1), 6 for A
(A2), 7 for A- (A3), 8 for BBB+ (Baa1), 9 for BBB (Baa2), 10 for BBB- (Baa3), 11 for BB+ (Ba1),
12 for BB (Ba2), 13 for BB- (Ba3), 14 for B+ (B1), 15 for B (B2) and 16 for B- (B3). Therefore, a
negative number means that the rst mentioned rating agency gives on average a better rating than
the other CRA in that comparison. Quarterly data for 2000-2008 are used. t-statistics based on robust
standard errors clustered by issuer are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signicance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Fitch vs. Fitch vs. Moody's vs. S&P Moody's vs. S&P
All Bonds Moody's S&P (Fitch rated sample) (full sample)
Dierence -0.538*** -0.397*** 0.154*** 0.185***
[-5.57] [-3.99] [2.79] [4.41]
N 70,624 70,747 70,738 104,435
N. issuers 450 449 452 818
AAA to AA-
Dierence -0.111 -0.118 0.0217 0.0415
[-1.53] [-0.98] [0.14] [0.47]
N 3,557 3,549 3,601 8,619
N. issuers 37 37 37 57
A+ to A-
Dierence -0.751*** -0.599*** 0.165* 0.203***
[-5.85] [-4.63] [1.80] [2.68]
N 36,461 36,539 36,532 48,905
N. issuers 232 232 233 475
BBB+ to BBB-
Dierence -0.294*** -0.223*** 0.072 0.117**
[-5.03] [-3.82] [1.11] [2.42]
N 24,177 24,193 24,186 36,841
N. issuers 277 278 276 451
BB+ to BB-
Dierence -0.492*** -0.0574 0.478*** 0.471***
[-4.76] [-0.35] [3.30] [4.71]
N 6,429 6,466 6,419 10,070
N. issuers 165 163 165 295
B+ to B-
Dierence -0.800*** -0.457** 0.369* 0.430***
[-6.80] [-2.46] [1.82] [3.20]
N 3,279 3,272 3,282 6,200












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cox Regressions for Time to Adding Fitch Rating
Cox Proportional Hazard model regressions of the time to adding a Fitch rating on rating category
dummies based on average Moody's and S&P (MSP) ratings, measures for uncertainty as Analyst
Dispersion (standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts normalized per dollar share value) and
MSP Rating Dispersion (absolute value of the notches dierence between Moody's and S&P), and
whether the Fitch rating 'could push' the issue to IG or A-. F could push IG and F could push A-
are dummies indicating whether the Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG or A-
boundary respectively. Other controls that are included but not shown are the rm Beta, Leverage,
PPE / Assets, R&D Expenses / Assets, ROA, Log of Oering Amount, Maturity Left and Maturity
Left Squared and Redeemable (see Table IV for descriptions). Quarterly data for 2000-2008 are used,
and the sample consists of all issues with both Moody's and S&P ratings that are on average rated
B- or better. Coecients on the covariates in the partial hazard function are reported, and t-statistics
are in brackets (using robust standard errors clustered by issuer). *, ** and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Pseudo R2 refers to McFadden (1973) pseudo
R2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MSP A+ to A- Rating 1.553*** 1.548*** 1.568*** 1.524***
[3.04] [3.06] [3.08] [3.06]
MSP BBB+ to BBB- Rating 1.146** 1.156** 1.119** 1.071**
[2.28] [2.32] [2.22] [2.19]
MSP BB+ to BB- Rating 1.346** 1.481*** 1.408*** 1.292**
[2.53] [2.79] [2.60] [2.49]
MSP B+ to B- Rating 1.131** 1.114** 1.159** 1.073**
[2.06] [2.06] [2.12] [2.00]
Fitch could pull IG 0.717*** 0.693*** 0.702**
[2.83] [2.83] [2.44]
Fitch could pull A 0.248 0.221 0.231
[1.23] [1.13] [1.00]
Avg MSP BB+ 0.292
[1.27]
Avg MSP BBB- 0.235
[1.41]
Notches of MSP -0.128
Rating Dispersion [-0.72]
S&P and Moodys Disagree -0.307 -0.267 -0.254 -0.251
[-1.16] [-0.90] [-1.03] [-1.02]
Analyst Dispersion -4.988 -4.262 -6.275 -6.479 -5.979
[-0.58] [-0.53] [-0.69] [-0.70] [-0.64]
Idiosyncratic Volatility -26.11*** -23.85*** -25.62*** -26.08*** -26.61***
[-3.95] [-3.86] [-3.86] [-3.93] [-3.88]
Log of Total Assets 0.296*** 0.200** 0.290*** 0.299*** 0.289***
[5.53] [2.57] [5.39] [5.67] [5.26]
N 38,351 38,351 38,351 38,351 38,351
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.019 0.029 0.029 0.028




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The table shows logit regressions of achieving a regulatory gain on rating category dummies, Analyst
Dispersion (standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts normalized per dollar share value) as a
measure for uncertainty and whether the Fitch rating 'could push' the issue to IG. F could push IG is
a dummy indicating whether the Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG boundary.
Other controls that are included but not shown are the rm Beta, Leverage, PPE / Assets, R&D
Expenses / Assets, ROA, Log of Oering Amount, Maturity Left and Maturity Left Squared and
Redeemable (see Table IV for descriptions). Quarterly data for 2000-2008 are used, and the sample
consists of all issues rated by Moody's, S&P and Fitch that are on average rated B- or better. Marginal
eects are reported for the regressions and all t-statistics are in brackets (using robust standard errors
clustered by issuer). *, ** and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
A+ to A- 0.0691 0.0698
[0.43] [0.42]
BBB+ to BBB- -0.155 -0.155
[-0.76] [-0.75]
BB+ to BB- -0.0823 -0.016
[-0.34] [-0.08]
B+ to B- -0.0516 -0.052
[-0.19] [-0.19]
Fitch could push IG 0.187*** 0.196***
[3.73] [3.62]
Analyst Dispersion 5.461 5.366 5.192
[1.44] [1.60] [1.41]
Idiosyncratic Volatility -1.432 -2.132 -1.735
[-0.34] [-0.44] [-0.40]
Log of Total Assets 0.0351 0.0476 0.0316
[0.90] [1.41] [0.80]
Other Controls Included Yes Yes Yes
Only with MSP disagreement Yes Yes Yes
Fitch added Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 569 569 569
pseudo R2 0.15 0.114 0.131
N. issuers 170 170 170
43Table IX
Logistic Regressions for Having a Rating Transitions
Logit regressions of having a rating transition next quarter on rating category dummies (AAA and
AA+ are merged to avoid singularities), a dummy indicating whether the issue has a Fitch rating or
not, measures for uncertainty as idiosyncratic volatility, beta, Analyst Dispersion (standard deviation
of analyst earning forecasts normalized per dollar share value) and MSP Rating Dispersion (absolute
value of the notches dierence between Moody's and S&P). See Table IV for descriptions of bond and
rm level control variables. Quarterly data for 2000-2008 are used, the sample consists of all issues with
both Moody's and S&P ratings. Only marginal eects are reported, and t-statistics are in brackets
(using robust standard errors clustered by issuer). *, ** and *** indicate statistical signicance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Moody's rating change S&P rating change
Fitch Rated 0.0128*** 0.0102***
[3.68] [2.94]




Analyst Dispersion 0.0459 0.0549
[1.27] [1.51]
Notches of MSP 0.0128*** 0.00611**
Rating Dispersion [4.55] [2.16]
MSP Rating FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 104,629 104,629
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.067
N. issuers 818 818
44Table X
Turnover Regressions
OLS regressions of quarterly bond turnover, measured as aggregated trading volume over total value
of outstanding bonds on rating category dummies, a dummy indicating whether the issue has a Fitch
rating or not and controls for o-the-run vs on-the-run eects (age). F makes (denies) IG is a dummy
equal to 1 if Moody's and S&P ratings are on opposite sides of the IG-HY boundary and the Fitch
rating is IG (HY). All other control variables are dropped due to the use of both time and issue xed
eects. Monthly data for July 2002-December 2008 are used; the sample consists of all issues with both
Moody's and S&P ratings. t-statistics are in brackets (using robust standard errors clustered by issuer).
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
MSP AAA to AA- Rating -2.889*** -2.887*** -2.891***
[-2.92] [-2.91] [-2.91]
MSP BBB+ to BBB- Rating 0.722 0.749 0.745
[0.97] [1.00] [0.94]
MSP BB+ to BB- Rating -2.434* -2.543* -2.554*
[-1.83] [-1.78] [-1.77]
MSP B+ to B- Rating -5.368*** -5.270*** -5.280***
[-3.51] [-3.40] [-3.38]
Age -4.035*** -4.033*** -4.022***
[-6.91] [-6.92] [-6.91]
F makes IG 4.208*** 4.213***
[2.67] [2.67]




Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Issue FE Yes Yes Yes
N 43,292 43,292 43,292
adj. R2 0.278 0.279 0.279
N. issuers 739 739 739
45Figure 1
FISD database coverage by CRA
The gure plots the percentage of bonds in FISD covered by S&P, Moody's and Fitch. While FISD starts
earlier, we use ratings starting in 2000, as S&P data seems incomplete before, as this gure suggests.
46Figure 2
Average Credit Spreads by Rating Category
47Figure 3
Rating Dierences Across CRAs
The gure plots rating dierences for dierent pairs of credit rating agencies (CRAs). We use a numerical
scale for ratings, where a lower rating score means a better (more optimistic or lower bankruptcy likeli-
hood) rating (see Table III for the full rating scale). In the gure, a negative number thus means that the
rst mentioned rating agency gives on average a better rating than the other CRA in that comparison.
48Figure 4
Default Prediction Accuracy
The gure plots the cumulative fraction of defaults on US corporate bonds over a one
year horizon against the cumulative fraction of ratings (from worst to best), for Moody's,
S&P and Fitch based on data from 2000 to 2008. The accuracy ratios that rating agen-
cies use for self-evaluation and that we report in Table VII Panel B are based on the
areas under the graphs. A larger area under the graph corresponds to a better accu-
racy. This type of graph is also known as a Cumulative Accuracy Power (CAP) curve.
49Internet Appendix for "Tiebreaker: Certication and Multiple
Credit Ratings"
Dion Bongaerts, K.J. Martijn Cremers, William N. Goetzmann
This Internet Appendix contains 9 supplementary tables to the main article.
Citation format: Bongaerts, Dion, K.J. Martijn Cremers and William N. Goetzmann, XXXX, Internet Appendix
to "Tiebreaker: Certication and Multiple Credit Ratings," Journal of Finance XXX, pp XXXX, http://www.afajof.
org/IA/XXXX.asp. Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting
information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the
article.
1Table IA.I
Summary Statistics of Quarterly Ratings Sample
The table presents summary statistics and a brief description for the sample of bond issues that have
both a Moody's and an S&P rating in the quarterly rating sample for 2000 - 2008.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Explanation
Fitch Rated 104,629 0.68 0.47 0 1 Dummy for Fitch rating
Fitch Rating 70,863 7.27 2.84 1 19 Fitch rating
Moodys Rating 104,629 7.85 3.07 1 18 Moody's Rating
S&P Rating 104,629 7.66 2.99 1 20 S&P rating
Fitch could push IG 104,629 0.04 0.19 0 1 Fitch could push IG
Fitch could push A- 104,629 0.05 0.22 0 1 Fitch could push A-
S&P and Moodys Dis-
agree
104,629 0.37 0.48 0 1 Dummy for MSP disagree-
ment
Notches of MSP Rat-
ing Dispersion
104,629 0.47 0.73 0 12 Notches of MSP rating
dispersion
Analyst Dispersion 104,629 0 0.02 0 1.66 Analyst dispersion
Stdev 104,629 0.02 0.01 0.0012 0.13 Daily idiosyncratic equity
volatility (past 180 days)
Beta 104,629 0.94 0.44 -1.01 4.39 Equity beta (past 180
days)
Log Total Assets 104,629 9.85 1.25 5.32 12.59 Log of total book value of
assets
PPE / Total Assets 104,629 0.38 0.23 0 0.96 PPE over total book as-
sets
R&D / Total Assets 104,629 0.01 0.02 0 0.23 R&D expenditure over to-
tal book assets
R&D missing 104,629 0.45 0.5 0 1 R&D expenditure missing
Leverage 104,629 0.35 0.15 0 6.04 Book leverage (debt/total
assets)




104,629 11.42 2.2 0 15.07 Log of oering amount
Maturity Left 104,629 9.61 10.71 0 98.52 Maturity left (years)
Redeemable 104,629 0.56 0.5 0 1 Dummy if the bond is re-
deemable
2Table IA.II
Fitch Inated Credit Spread Regressions on Fitch Rating Additions
This table is equivalent to Table V of the main article except that for determining whether Fitch is
better, equal or worse than the average of Moody's and S&P rating, the Fitch rating is corrected with
one notch. Thus, an original AAA rating by Fitch would in this table correspond to a AA+ rating.
The column with only a dummy for a Fitch rating added in Table V is not replicated here since it is
invariant to this correction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fitch added and better -0.726 0.132 -5.533 -2.973 -1.09
[-0.09] [0.02] [-0.73] [-0.35] [-0.15]
Fitch added and equal -6.747 -6.22 -10.37 1.624 -1.683
[-0.84] [-0.77] [-0.95] [0.32] [-0.13]
Fitch added and worse 2.645 2.953 9.538 2.909 3.203
[0.64] [0.71] [1.06] [0.70] [0.77]
Fitch added and makes IG -30.71*** -22.98**
[-2.86] [-2.15]
Fitch added and denies IG 11.16 22.99
[0.60] [0.89]
At IG boundary 15.57*** 11.10***
[3.26] [2.60]








Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment All All BBB+ to BB- All All
N 34,621 34,621 15,100 34,724 34,621
adj. R2 0.531 0.532 0.626 0.534 0.531
N. issuers 671 671 465 672 671
3Table IA.III
CRA Default Prediction with MSP Disagreement
Using yearly panel data between 2000 and 2008, we compare CRA performance with respect to default
prediction on a one year horizon. The table shows results from a logit regression of issuer default events
on Moody's and S&P rating scales, rating dierences between Moody's and Fitch, dummies for the
eect of Fitch as a tiebreaker when Moody's and S&P are at dierent sides of the IG boundary and
time xed eects for the complete universe of bonds that are rated by all three CRAs. The rating
variables are in notches where 1 corresponds to AAA. The dierence variables measure the dierence
between the First minus the second CRA in notches. Column 1 is restricted to cases where Moody's and
S&P disagree. Only marginal eects are reported (multiplied by 10,000 for readability), and t-statistics
are in brackets (using robust standard errors clustered by issuer). *, ** and *** indicate signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
Moody's Rating 5.00*** 3.91***
[3.28] [4.00]
S&P Rating 0.403 0.37
[0.54] [0.65]
Dierence Fitch vs Moody's 5.00***
[3.28]
Fitch makes IG -5.63
[-1.52]
Fitch denies IG -4.08
[-0.96]
Year FE Yes Yes
Moody's and S&P disagree only Yes No
N 56,376 112,329
pseudo R2 0.372 0.369
N. issuers 1693 2066
4Table IA.IV
Credit Spread Regressions, Full Sample
Using quarterly panel data between 2002 and 2008, we regress credit spread levels for AAA to B- rated
bonds on bond and rm characteristics, with rating and time xed eects. Main variables of interest
are whether a Fitch rating is better (FR < MSP), equal to (FR = MSP) or worse (FR > MSP) than
the average Moody's and S&P rating, as well as variables relating to regulation (IG). See Table IA.V
for descriptions of other control variable descriptions. However, levels instead of changes are used for
the controls. Time xed eects are estimated for the IG and HY category separately to accommodate
the sharp widening of the IG/HY spread during the crisis. t-statistics are in brackets (using robust
standard errors clustered by issuer). *, ** and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fitch<MSP 4.314 5.487 3.771 4.1
[1.14] [1.42] [1.00] [1.12]
Fitch=MSP 7.151** 7.184** 6.594* 7.678**
[2.12] [2.15] [1.94] [2.27]
Fitch>MSP 16.37** 13.16** 16.68** 15.71**
[2.28] [2.04] [2.30] [2.18]
Fitch makes IG -26.35***
[-2.62]










Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE by IG/HY yes yes yes yes
MSP Rating FE yes yes yes yes
N 44,139 44,139 43,711 44,139
adj. R2 0.814 0.815 0.815 0.814











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Logistic Regressions for Having a Fitch Rating with Double Clustering
Logit regressions of having a Fitch rating on rating category dummies based on average Moody's and
S&P (MSP) ratings, measures for uncertainty as Analyst Dispersion (standard deviation of analyst
earning forecasts normalized per dollar share value), Dummy S&P and Moody's Disagree or Notches
of MSP Rating Dispersion (absolute value of the notches dierence between Moody's and S&P), and F
Could Break Tie and F Could Push A- are dummies indicating whether the Moody's and S&P ratings
are on opposite sides of the IG-HY and A- boundaries respectively. All specications further include
industry xed eects. Other controls that are included but not shown are the rm Beta, Leverage, PPE
/ Assets, R&D Expenses / Assets, ROA, Log of Oering Amount, Maturity Left and Maturity Left
Squared and Redeemable (see Table IA.V for descriptions). Quarterly data for 2000-2008 are used, and
the sample consists of all issues with both Moody's and S&P ratings that are on average rated B- or
better. Only coecient estimates are reported, and t-statistics are in brackets using robust standard
errors clustered by issuer in Column (1) and standard errors clustered by issuer and time in Column
(2). *, ** and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Double
clustered standard errors are calculated using the Stata code available on Mitchel Petersen's website.
(1) (2)
MSP Rating A+ to A- 2.411*** 2.411***
[3.76] [3.69]
MSP Rating BBB+ to BBB- 2.440*** 2.440***
[3.84] [3.74]
MSP Rating BB+ to BB- 2.645*** 2.645***
[4.00] [3.92]
MSP Rating B+ to B- 2.472*** 2.472***
[3.45] [3.39]
Fitch Could Break Tie 0.705*** 0.705***
[2.61] [2.66]
Fitch Could Pull A 0.172 0.172
[0.58] [0.59]
Notches of MSP Rating Dispersion -0.213 -0.213
[-0.87] [-0.89]
Analyst Dispersion 4.331 4.331
[0.96] [0.82]
Industry FE yes yes
Double clustering no yes
N 104,435 104,435
pseudo R2 0.224
N. issuers 818
12T
a
b
l
e
I
A
.
I
X
C
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
C
r
e
d
i
t
S
p
r
e
a
d
s
a
n
d
R
a
t
i
n
g
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
,
v
e
r
i

c
a
t
i
o
n
t
e
s
t
s
U
s
i
n
g
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
p
a
n
e
l
d
a
t
a
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
2
0
0
2
a
n
d
2
0
0
8
,
w
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
c
r
e
d
i
t
s
p
r
e
a
d
s
f
o
r
A
A
A
t
o
B
-
r
a
t
e
d
b
o
n
d
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
a
l
l
t
h
r
e
e
C
R
A
s
o
n
r
a
t
i
n
g
u
p
-
a
n
d
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
s
f
o
r
a
l
l
t
h
r
e
e
C
R
A
s
,
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
b
o
n
d
a
n
d

r
m
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
f
o
r
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
e

e
c
t
s
a
n
d
t
i
m
e

x
e
d
e

e
c
t
s
.
U
p
-
a
n
d
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
s
a
r
e
c
o
d
e
d
a
s
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
t
h
r
e
e
C
R
A
s
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
d
o
r
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
d
i
t
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
.
T
h
e
s
e

r
m
a
n
d
b
o
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
a
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
b
u
t
n
o
t
s
h
o
w
n
(
a
l
l
i
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
)
:
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
l
i
q
u
i
d
a
t
i
o
n
/
i
n
t
r
i
n
s
i
c
v
a
l
u
e
(
P
P
E
/
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
,
R
&
D
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
(
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
t
o
t
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
,
R
O
A
(
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
n
a
s
s
e
t
s
)
,
S
t
d
e
v
(
d
a
i
l
y
i
d
i
o
s
y
n
c
r
a
t
i
c
e
q
u
i
t
y
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
)
,
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
E
q
u
i
t
y
B
e
t
a
(
h
a
l
f
y
e
a
r
d
a
i
l
y
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
f
o
r
B
i
d
-
A
s
k
-
b
o
u
n
c
e
s
)
,
L
o
g
T
o
t
a
l
A
s
s
e
t
s
(

r
m
s
i
z
e
,
b
o
o
k
v
a
l
u
e
)
a
n
d
L
o
g
O

e
r
i
n
g
S
i
z
e
(
i
s
s
u
e
s
i
z
e
)
,
R
e
d
e
e
m
a
b
l
e
(
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
c
a
l
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
)
,
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
C
o
n
v
e
x
i
t
y
.
F
i
t
c
h
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
,
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
a
n
d
S
&
P
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
a
r
e
a
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
C
R
A
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
m
a
d
e
t
h
e
i
s
s
u
e
q
u
a
l
i
f
y
f
o
r
I
G
,
w
h
i
l
e
F
i
t
c
h
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
,
b
r
e
a
k
s
n
o
t
i
e
a
n
y
m
o
r
e
,
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
,
b
r
e
a
k
s
n
o
t
i
e
a
n
y
m
o
r
e
a
n
d
S
&
P
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
,
b
r
e
a
k
s
n
o
t
i
e
a
n
y
m
o
r
e
a
r
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
a
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
b
y
t
h
e
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
C
R
A
m
a
d
e
t
h
e
i
s
s
u
e
l
o
s
e
i
t
s
I
G
q
u
a
l
i

c
a
t
i
o
n
.
F
i
t
c
h
C
o
u
l
d
B
r
e
a
k
T
i
e
,
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
C
o
u
l
d
B
r
e
a
k
T
i
e
a
n
d
S
&
P
C
o
u
l
d
B
r
e
a
k
T
i
e
a
r
e
a
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
b
y
t
h
e
o
t
h
e
r
C
R
A
s
a
r
e
o
n
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
e
s
i
d
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
I
G
-
H
Y
b
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
3
)
a
n
d
(
4
)
a
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
i
s
s
u
e
s
r
a
t
e
d
A
-
o
r
b
e
t
t
e
r
b
y
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
a
n
d
S
&
P
,
w
h
e
r
e
a
s
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
a
n
d
(
6
)
a
r
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
i
s
s
u
e
s
r
a
t
e
d
B
B
B
+
o
r
w
o
r
s
e
b
y
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
a
n
d
S
&
P
.
t
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
a
r
e
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
(
u
s
i
n
g
r
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
i
s
s
u
e
r
;
N
.
i
s
s
u
e
r
g
i
v
e
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
i
s
s
u
e
r
s
)
.
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
i
g
n
i

c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
l
e
v
e
l
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
'
F
-
t
e
s
t
M
u
p
=
M
d
o
w
n
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
'
a
n
d
'
F
-
t
e
s
t
S
P
u
p
=
S
P
d
o
w
n
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
'
g
i
v
e
t
h
e
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
t
e
s
t
o
n
t
h
e
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
n
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
a
n
d
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
b
e
i
n
g
e
q
u
a
l
a
n
d
t
h
e
t
e
s
t
o
n
t
h
e
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
n
S
&
P
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
a
n
d
S
&
P
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
b
e
i
n
g
e
q
u
a
l
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
S
i
m
i
l
a
r
l
y
'
F
-
t
e
s
t
M
u
p
,
t
i
e
=
M
d
o
w
n
,
t
i
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
'
a
n
d
'
F
-
t
e
s
t
S
P
u
p
,
t
i
e
=
S
P
d
o
w
n
,
t
i
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
'
g
i
v
e
t
h
e
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
t
e
s
t
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
n
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
d
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
a
n
d
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
d
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
b
e
i
n
g
e
q
u
a
l
a
n
d
t
h
e
t
e
s
t
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
n
S
&
P
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
d
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
a
n
d
S
&
P
D
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
d
,
B
r
e
a
k
s
T
i
e
b
e
i
n
g
e
q
u
a
l
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
-
4
.
4
6
3
*
-
5
.
4
1
4
*
*
-
8
.
7
0
4
*
*
*
-
2
.
4
9
3
-
2
.
4
1
8
-
2
.
5
8
7
[
-
1
.
9
0
]
[
-
2
.
3
4
]
[
-
3
.
1
8
]
[
-
1
.
1
3
]
[
-
1
.
1
3
]
[
-
1
.
1
7
]
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
1
4
.
0
6
*
*
*
9
.
1
4
9
*
*
1
8
.
5
5
*
*
*
7
.
3
7
8
*
*
7
.
0
3
2
*
8
.
2
3
9
*
*
[
4
.
0
9
]
[
2
.
2
2
]
[
3
.
9
7
]
[
2
.
0
7
]
[
1
.
8
9
]
[
2
.
4
1
]
S
&
P
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
-
4
.
9
7
7
*
-
1
0
.
4
1
*
*
*
-
4
.
8
4
6
-
4
.
3
2
1
-
3
.
7
0
1
-
3
.
8
3
3
[
-
1
.
8
4
]
[
-
2
.
6
4
]
[
-
1
.
6
5
]
[
-
1
.
6
2
]
[
-
1
.
3
7
]
[
-
1
.
4
0
]
S
&
P
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
1
6
.
6
3
*
*
*
4
.
0
9
4
2
0
.
4
3
*
*
*
1
8
.
7
0
*
*
*
1
3
.
1
3
*
*
*
1
2
.
9
5
*
*
*
[
4
.
3
9
]
[
1
.
0
6
]
[
4
.
7
6
]
[
4
.
2
1
]
[
3
.
5
2
]
[
3
.
5
0
]
F
i
t
c
h
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
-
4
.
9
4
8
-
5
.
2
0
7
*
-
4
.
0
8
6
[
-
1
.
6
4
]
[
-
1
.
7
2
]
[
-
1
.
3
6
]
F
i
t
c
h
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
4
.
6
3
1
4
.
7
7
9
4
.
2
[
0
.
8
0
]
[
0
.
8
4
]
[
0
.
7
1
]
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
13T
a
b
l
e
I
A
.
I
X
{
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
f
r
o
m
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
p
a
g
e
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
F
i
t
c
h
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
d
a
n
d
b
r
e
a
k
s
-
8
.
7
9
6
t
i
e
[
-
0
.
6
2
]
F
i
t
c
h
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
d
a
n
d
4
.
1
8
1
b
r
e
a
k
s
n
o
t
i
e
a
n
y
m
o
r
e
[
0
.
2
1
]
F
i
t
c
h
c
o
u
l
d
b
r
e
a
k
t
i
e
1
0
.
2
7
*
*
[
2
.
0
8
]
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
d
a
n
d
-
2
.
4
7
9
3
.
7
6
4
-
0
.
7
2
8
1
.
1
8
3
b
r
e
a
k
s
t
i
e
[
-
0
.
3
7
]
[
0
.
5
8
]
[
-
0
.
1
2
]
[
0
.
2
1
]
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
d
a
n
d
1
.
0
5
2
-
2
.
0
6
8
-
1
.
1
5
6
-
1
8
.
9
7
b
r
e
a
k
s
n
o
t
i
e
a
n
y
m
o
r
e
[
0
.
0
4
]
[
-
0
.
0
8
]
[
-
0
.
0
4
]
[
-
0
.
7
0
]
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
c
o
u
l
d
b
r
e
a
k
t
i
e
2
.
8
1
8
-
0
.
7
9
2
2
.
6
6
1
-
6
.
3
3
1
[
0
.
7
4
]
[
-
0
.
2
6
]
[
0
.
7
1
]
[
-
1
.
3
8
]
S
&
P
u
p
g
r
a
d
e
d
a
n
d
b
r
e
a
k
s
-
1
4
.
2
5
*
-
1
0
.
0
3
-
1
3
.
2
1
*
-
1
2
.
1
t
i
e
[
-
1
.
8
2
]
[
-
1
.
5
7
]
[
-
1
.
7
3
]
[
-
1
.
5
8
]
S
&
P
d
o
w
n
g
r
a
d
e
d
a
n
d
4
0
.
1
5
*
*
*
3
6
.
0
8
*
*
*
3
9
.
5
1
*
*
*
4
0
.
5
3
*
*
*
b
r
e
a
k
s
n
o
t
i
e
a
n
y
m
o
r
e
[
2
.
9
8
]
[
2
.
9
2
]
[
2
.
8
4
]
[
2
.
6
1
]
S
&
P
c
o
u
l
d
b
r
e
a
k
t
i
e
1
1
.
8
7
*
*
*
8
.
4
6
8
*
*
1
2
.
1
4
*
*
*
7
.
7
9
7
*
[
2
.
6
1
]
[
2
.
1
3
]
[
2
.
6
4
]
[
1
.
6
6
]
T
i
m
e
F
E
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
r
a
t
e
d
b
y
A
l
l
3
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
R
a
n
g
e
A
l
l
A
l
l

A
-

A
-

B
B
B
+

B
B
B
+
A
l
l
A
l
l
A
l
l
N
2
4
2
8
2
2
4
2
8
2
1
1
3
3
0
1
1
3
3
0
1
2
9
5
2
1
2
9
5
2
2
4
2
8
2
2
4
2
8
2
2
4
2
8
2
a
d
j
.
R
2
0
.
5
3
1
0
.
5
3
7
0
.
4
5
1
0
.
4
5
1
0
.
6
0
2
0
.
6
0
8
0
.
5
3
4
0
.
5
3
7
0
.
5
3
8
N
.
i
s
s
u
e
r
3
8
0
3
8
0
1
1
7
1
1
7
3
1
3
3
1
3
3
8
0
3
8
0
3
8
0
F
-
t
e
s
t
M
u
p
=
M
d
o
w
n
(
p
-
v
a
l
)
0
0
.
0
0
8
0
0
.
0
1
5
F
-
t
e
s
t
M
u
p
,
t
i
e
=
M
d
o
w
n
,
t
i
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
)
0
.
8
9
7
0
.
8
3
3
0
.
9
8
7
F
-
t
e
s
t
S
P
u
p
=
S
P
d
o
w
n
(
p
-
v
a
l
)
0
0
.
0
0
8
0
0
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
14T
a
b
l
e
I
A
.
I
X
{
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
f
r
o
m
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
p
a
g
e
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
F
-
t
e
s
t
S
P
u
p
,
t
i
e
=
S
P
d
o
w
n
,
t
i
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
)
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
1
15